

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MOGADI 00506 01 OF 02 080439Z

11

ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-06 IO-03 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-03

SP-02 L-01 INR-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 SAM-01 NEA-06 SAJ-01

ACDA-10 IGA-01 /063 W

----- 032287

R 070944Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2785

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0506

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, SO, UR, ET, US

SUBJECT: SIAD, THE SOVIET UNION AND ETHIOPIA

REF: MOGADISCIO 0404

SUMMARY.

IN VIEW OF CURRENT UNCERTAINTY IN ETHIOPIA AND DIFFICULT CHOICES US WILL CONTINUE TO FACE IN ADDIS, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO ATTEMPT TO UPDATE SIAD'S INTENTIONS REGARDING ETHIOPIA, TAKING SOVIET FACTOR MORE SQUARELY INTO ACCOUNT. CURRENT PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON SIAD-- WHICH ARE FORMIDABLE-- INCLUDE DROUGHT, SOMALI ECONOMIC PROSTRATION BUT, MORE BASIC THAN EITHER, SIAD'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION. SOVIET STAKE IN SOMALIA INVOLVES AMBITIONS IN RED SEA BASIN, IN AFRICA, ARABIAN PENINSULA AND INDIAN OCEAN WHICH NOW APPEAR TO GO FAR BEYOND ANY IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGES AVAILABLE IN OGADEN. WE THINK SIAD AN ACCOMPLICE TO SOVIET REGIONAL AMBITIONS. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT SO LONG AS US MAINTAINS EVEN MINIMAL MILITARY SUPPORT ROLE IN ETHIOPIA, SOVIET ABILITY TO RESTRAIN SIAD IN SUPPORT OF ITS LARGER OBJECTIVES IS REINFORCED. WE BELIEVE MOREOVER THAT SIAD HAS PHILOSOPHICALLY ACCEPTED SOVIET RESTRAINT, NOT IN ANY TACIT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOGADI 00506 01 OF 02 080439Z

SURRENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT IN HIS IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO BUILD

SOMALI SOCIALIST STATE UNDER SOVIET TUTELAGE. WHILE SOVIET ROLE IN SOMALIA, IN RED SEA, INDIAN OCEAN, ETC., SEEKS OUR ULTIMATE EXPULSION FROM AREA, WE BELIEVE SHORT TERM SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA CURRENTLY BENEFITS BOTH US AND ETHIOPIA. IF SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE THREATENED, OR REDUCED, THEN DANGERS TO ETHIOPIA WOULD BE INCREASED. SO LONG AS SOVIET INFLUENCE PARAMOUNT -- AS IT IS AT PRESENT -- THEN WE BELIEVE US AND ETHIOPIA HAVE MORE TIME TO SORT OUT THEIR PROBLEMS THAN IS COMMONLY SUPPOSED. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE LONG KNOWN SIAD'S SOCIALIST AMBITIONS AND HIS CONVICTION THAT SOCIALISM IS ONLY HOPE FOR SOMALIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. IN THREE YEARS SINCE SIAD ADOPTED SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM HE HAS PROVIDED ENOUGH EVIDENCE FOR US TO RECOGNIZE HIS ALLIANCE WITH PROGRESSIVE WORLD SOCIALISM, HIS BELIEF IN ITS "SCIENTIFIC" TRUTH AS DEMONSTRATED BY STRENGTH AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF USSR, AND HIS FAITH IN A HISTORICAL DIALECTIC WHOSE INEVITABLE RESULTS WILL REPLACE DYING IMPERIALISM WITH NEW SOCIAL ORDER BASED UPON SOVIET MODEL.

2. GIVEN UNREALITY OF MOST OF THIS THIRD WORLD RHETORIC, HOWEVER, WHAT WE HAVE LACKED TO DATE IS CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT SIAD'S MARXISM AND HIS COMPLICITY WITH SOVIETS IS NOT MERELY TOOL TO SERVE HIS LOCAL AMBITIONS, INCLUDING RECOVERY OF SOMALI LANDS IN HORN.

3. IN PAST, WE HAVE WEIGHED SIAD'S SOVIET TIES AND HIS IDEOLOGICAL CLAIMS CHIEFLY IN PRACTICAL TERMS. WE HAVE VIEWED THEM AS MEANS OF GETTING AND KEEPING SOVIET WEAPONRY. WE HAVE WATCHED NUMBERS AND KINDS OF WEAPONS BROUGHT TO SOMALIA BY RUSSIANS AND MEASURED THEIR MEANING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN TERMS OF ETHIOPIA'S SECURITY. WE HAVE COUNTED NUMBERS OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN SOMALIA, BUT HAVE GIVEN LESS WEIGHT TO THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS, IN NSS, IN POLITICAL OFFICE AND IN PRESIDENCY DESPITE FACT THAT SIAD'S COLLABORATION WITH THESE ADVISORS, -- LIKE THE PRESENCE OF SAM-2'S AT MOGADISCIO -- IT ITSELF UNIQUE. WE HAVE AS A RESULT BEEN CONSIDERABLY LESS PRECISE ABOUT IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTH OF SIAD/SOVIET COLLABORATION AND ITS LARGER SIGNIFICANCE FOR AREA.

4. WITH THAT BACKGROUND IN MIND, WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET INSTALLATION AT BERBERA -- REFERRED TO IN SCHLESINGER'S NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW --
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOGADI 00506 01 OF 02 080439Z

WOULD EFFECTIVELY DEMOLISH ANY DOUBTS WE HAVE ABOUT SIAD'S UNIQUE OR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION. THERE IS IN OUR VIEW NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION FOR THIS MISSILE PRESENCE EXCEPT TO SHOW IRREFUTABLY SIAD'S SPECIAL STATUS AS MEMBER OF SOVIET-LED SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. WE BELIEVE, IN SHORT, THAT SIAD IS NOW AN ACCOMPLICE OF SOVIET DIALECTIC, WHICH EXPLAINS HIS CONCENTRATION ON PROGRESSIVE NATION-BUILDING AT HOME AND HIS ACCEPTANCE OF MORE ADVANCED SOVIET WEAPONS ON SOMALI SOIL, NOT RPT NOT ONLY TO PROTECT

SOMALIA FROM FORCES OF REACTION -- THE DIALECTICAL ENEMY -- BUT ALSO TO SERVE SOVIET STRATEGIC AMBITIONS IN AREA, WHICH WILL ALSO BENEFIT SOMALIA AS MEMBER OF PROGRESSIVE COMMONWEALTH.

5. IN OUR VIEW, SIAD'S COLLUSION WITH SOVIETS MORE FULLY EXPLAINS SIAD'S ABSOLUTISM AT HOME AND HIS INFLEXIBILITY ABROAD (I.E., ARAB LEAGUE), PARTICULARLY WHEN MORE MODERATION COULD HAVE BROUGHT ECONOMIC

OR POLITICAL DIVIDENDS WITHOUT COMPROMISING SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT. IT ALSO CLARIFIES HIS OVERTURES TO US, WHICH HE HAS PEGGED TO SOVIET/US DETENTE AND WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, DO NOT RPT NOT MEAN HE IS SEEKING RELIEF FROM SOVIET HEGEMONY (SEPTEL).

SECRET

NNN

SECRET POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 MOGADI 00506 02 OF 02 071103Z

11
ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 NEA-06 INR-05 IO-03 L-01

PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 SAM-01

SAJ-01 ACDA-10 IGA-01 /065 W
----- 019782

R 070944Z APR 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2786
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0506

LIMDIS

6. EVIDENCE OF STRENGTH OF SIAD'S IDEOLOGICAL TIES TO SOVIETS MOREOVER IS SEEN IN HIS HADLING OF TWO PROBLEMS: ONE, THE CONTINUING ONE OF HIS RELATIONS WITH ARAB LEAGUE; AND SECONDLY, HIS EXECUTION OF SOMALI SHEIKHS.

7. A. WHATEVER BENEFITS SIAD EXPECTED FROM ARAB LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP, THEWPAYOFF HAS BEEN SMALL. HIS REFUSAL TO SURRENDER MARXIST TINT TO HIS SOCIALISM OR TO LOOSEN HIS SOVIET TIES, EVEN SYMBOLICALLY, HAS DENIED HIM ALL BUT MINIMAL ECONOMIC SUPPORT. WHILE HIS IDEOLOGICAL

STUBBORNESS HAS COST HIM ECONOMICALLY, IT HAS NOT DENIED HIM PARTICIPATION IN LEAGUE AFFAIRS, WHERE HIS POSITION HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY ANTI-EGYPTIAN AND PRO-SOVIET. BECAUSE SOMALI-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY (JULY, 1974) FOLLOWED HIS DECISION TO JOIN LEAGUE, LATTER WAS VIEWED AS A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO RECOVER ITS INFLUENCE. WE THINK SOVIET INFLUENCE WAS NEVER LOST AND BELIEVE SIAD'S ARAB LEAGUE DECISION WAS MOST SURELY ENDORSED BY SOVIETS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES IT BROUGHT THEM. ITS MOST IMMEDIATE RESULT EMERGED MONTH LATER WHEN PDY AND SOMALIA WERE JOINED TOGETHER UNDER ARRANGEMENT ARAB LEAGUE COULD ENDORSE, BUT WHICH SOVIET UNION PUT TOGETHER. SIAD'S GOALS IN LEAGUE ARE, WE CONCLUDE, POLITICAL NO LESS THAN ECONOMIC AND SERVE SOVIET'S REGIONAL INTERESTS, A FACT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MOGADI 00506 02 OF 02 071103Z

WHICH PERHAPS HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSCORED.

B. THE SHEIKH AFFAIR IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SIAD'S FLEXIBILITY IN

DEFENSE OF IDEOLOGY. LONG BEFORE HE JOINED ARAB LEAGUE, SIAD WAS ADVOCATE OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN, WHICH HAS BEEN IMPORTANT PLANK IN HIS BUILDING SCHEME SINCE 1972. THIS PLANK WAS TAKEN FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PLATFORM AND HAS BEEN PUSHED BY SOVIETS, WHO HAVE SHREWDLY EXPLOITED FEMINIST LINKS IN SOMALIA, AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY WITH FEW CADRES AVAILABLE FOR SOVIET PENETRATION. SIAD'S SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS IS RESULT OF THAT IDEOLOGICAL COLLABORATION AND SHEIKHS, WHO CHALLENGED IT, WERE EXECUTED.

8. WHILE IT IS RECKLESS TO CLAIM THAT SIAD'S RESTRAINT IN OGADEN CAN BE THEORETICALLY GUARANTEED BY ANY SINGLE FACTOR, INCLUDING SOVIET LINK AND SOCIALIST NATION-BUILDING AT HOME, EVIDENCE TO DATE POINTS THAT WAY. SIAD'S ENERGIES HAVE BEEN EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED TO BUILDING WITH SOVIET SUPPORT A SOCIALIST SOCIETY BASED ON SOVIET MODEL. HE HAS INTRODUCED ALL POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTROLS REQUIRED FOR THAT TASK; HE HAS LAUNCHED MASS INDOCTRINATION EFFORT AND ATTEMPTS AT CADRE FORMATION THROUGHOUT SOMALIA. HE HAS IMPRISONED THOSE GROUPS WHO WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SOCIALIST BUILDING CAMPAIGN (MOGADISCIO 0388) AND HAS NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED SOMALI IRREDENTISM TO GIVE COHERENCE OR PURPOSE TO HIS INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL POLICY.

9. IF SOVIET POSITION IN SOMALIA WERE TO BECOME SHAKY OR UNSURE, THEN CONSEQUENCES FOR ETHIOPIA WOULD BE MORE SERIOUS. IF SOVIET GRIP ON SIAD BEGAN TO SLIP, THEN IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT BE OPENED UP TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. ON SOMALI SIDE, REDUCTION OF SOVIET CONTROL OR SIAD'S OUSTER WOULD PROBABLY MEAN REVIVAL OF ETHNIC UNIFICATION AS PRINCIPAL POLICY GOAL, WITH INCREASED DANGERS TO OGADEN.

10. WHILE SIGNS EXIST IN PUBLIC AND IN GSDR CIRCLES OF GROWING DISSATISFACTION WITH STRENGTH OF SOVIET ROLE MUN SOMALIA, WE DOUBT

THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN JEOPARDY. WE BELIEVE MOREOVER THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE AT APRESENT IS POSITIVE INsofar AS ETHIOPIA AND US ARE CONCERNED. GIVEN SOVIET STAKE IN SOMALIA, WHICH REFLECTS LARGER AMBITIONS IN RED SEA BASIN, INDIAN OCEAN, AFRICA, ETC., WE DON'T

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MOGADI 00506 02 OF 02 071103Z

BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD RISK JEOPARDIZING THOSE LONGER TERM AMBITIONS FOR LIMITED OR UNCERTAIN END IN OGADEN, PARTICULARLY SO LONG AS US MAINTAINS EVEN MINIMAL MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ADDIS. WHILE SOVIETS SEEK ULTIMATE EXPULSION OF US INFLUENCE IN HORN AND AREA, OVER SHORT TERM WE SUSPECT THEY CAN USE US ROLE IN ETHIOPIA AS SUREST MEANS OF MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING THEIR CURRENT ADVANTAGES IN SOMALIA. WE WOULD SPECULATE -- AND SPECULATE ONLY -- THAT US PULLOUT IN ADDIS WOULD PROBABLY CONFRONT THEM WITH CONFLICTING POLICY CHOICES IN HORN WHICH THEY PERHAPS NOT RPT NOT PREPARED TO MAKE.

11. WE NOTE FINALLY THAT SOVIETS -- IN WASHINGTON AND ADDIS -- HAVE TOLD US SIAD WON'T STIR UP PROBLEMS IN OGADEN. WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE ASSUMED ON OUR PART A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR ROLE IN SOMALIA THAN WE'VE BEEN WILLING TO DISCOVER FOR OURSELVES. WE THINK TIME HAS PROBABLY COME FOR US TO UNEQUIVOCALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ROLE.

HAMRICK

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975MOGADI00506
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750121-0029
From: MOGADISCIO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750475/aaaacrbr.tel
Line Count: 250
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION AF
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: 75 MOGADISCIO 0404
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 AUG 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 AUG 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <15 DEC 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SIAD, THE SOVIET UNION AND ETHIOPIA
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, SO, UR, ET, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006